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Case No. 20150492-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
UENNIS TERRY WYNN,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Wynn pled guilty in 2008 to four counts of securities fraud: two
second-degree felonies and two third-degree felonies. He appeals from the
denial of his 2015 motions to correct a clerical error under Utah R. Crim. P.
30(b), to correct an illegal sentence under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e), and to
grant relief from a final judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). This Court
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009 &
Supp. 2015). 1
INTRODUCTION
As part of his 2008 plea agreement, Wynn agreed to pay "many times
more" than $100,000 to his securities fraud victims. Wynn agreed that his

1

Unless otherwise stated all Utah code citations are to the current
version.

attorney and the prosecutor would agree to and submit the final restitution
figure by October 6, 2008. Three weeks before that date, the prosecutor sent
a restitution figure of about $782,000-broken down by victims-to Wynn's
counsel, asking that counsel let him know if he objected to the figure.
Receiving no objection, the prosecutor submitted the figure to the trial court
on October 6, 2008.

Seventeen days later, the trial court-still without

objection from Wynn-entered a restitution order for the submitted
amount.
Nearly five years later, Wynn told a parole hearing officer that the
entered $782,000 figure "sounds correct."

Within a few weeks of that

hearing, Wynn was notified that the Board of Pardons and Parole intended
to hold him until his sentence expired, but would consider early release if
he paid his restitution in full.
Nearly two years after the Board's decision and six-and-a-half years
after the trial court's restitution order, Wynn- for the first time- challenged
the accuracy of the restitution figure and the validity of his prison sentence
in alternative motions to correct a clerical error under rule 30(b), to correct
an illegal sentence under rule 22(e), and for relief from judgment under rule
60(b)(6).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was the final unobjected-to restitution figure a clerical mistake
under rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?

Standard of Review. What constitutes a clerical error under rule 30(b)
presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Rodrigues,
2009 UT 62, if11, 218 P.3d 610.
2. Was Wynn's statutory prison sentence or his final restitution order
manifestly or patently illegal under rule 22(e)?

Standard of Review. Whether a sentence is illegal under rule 22(e) is a
question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Vaughn, 2011 UT App
411, if 9, 266 P.3d 202.
3. (a) The Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) provides "the sole
remedy" for challenging a criminal conviction or sentence after a defendant
has exhausted his legal remedies, including a direct appeal.
May Wynn, who never appealed, evade the PCRA's time and
procedural requirements by filing a rule 60(b) motion?
(b)

Alternatively, was Wynn's rule 60(b)(6) motion-filed s1x-

and-one-half years after entry of the restitution order-brought within a
reasonable time?
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Standard of Review. A trial court's interpretation of which law applies
is reviewed for correctness. See Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ,V, 285 P.3d 1133.
A trial court's ruling that a rule 60(b)(6) motion was not brought within a
reasonable time is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

See Menzies v.

Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,r 63, 150 P.3d 480.
4. Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's discovery motion
after concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief under rules 30(b),
22(e), and 60(b)?

Standard of Review.

This question presents a question of law,

reviewed for correctness. See State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, if 3, 148 P.3d 990.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following rules and statutes are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b)
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-101, et. seq. (Post-Conviction Remedies Act)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
17 state felony charges
The State charged Wynn in 2006 with 19 felonies: three counts of
second-degree felony securities fraud; three counts of third-degree felony
securities fraud; eight counts of second-degree felony theft; two counts of
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third-degree felony exploitation of an elder adult; two counts of thirddegree felony witness tampering; and one count of second-degree felony
pattern of unlawful activity. Rl-2. The State dismissed the two witness
tampering charges at preliminary hearing. R66-67. Wynn was bound over
on the remaining 17 charges.

Securities fraud charges.

According to the probable cause affidavit,

Wynn sold securities in a scheme to "flip" vehicles and real property. R1314. Wynn collected about $185,000 from at least six investors. 2 Id. Instead

of using the money as promised, Wynn used it all for personal and
unrelated business expenses. R14-15.
When soliciting funds, Wynn did not tell his investors several
material facts, such as that (1) he had filed personal bankruptcy in 1989; (2)
his company had filed for bankruptcy in 2002; (3) he had over $2 million in
outstanding civil judgments; (4) he had a $163,860 tax lien against his
property; and (5) he was delinquent on principal and interest payments to a
previous investor. R15-16.

2

The information in fact names nine securities fraud victims. Rl-10.
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Theft charges. According to the probable cause statement, Wynn also
collected $62,000 to buy automobiles for three victims. 3 R13-14.

Wynn

neither bought the promised vehicles nor returned the money. R14.
7 federal mail and securities fraud indictments

and $15 million in restitution
In 2007, a few months after the state charges were filed, Wynn was
indicted in federal court on seven counts of mail and securities fraud. R2O810. Wynn sought and received a continuance in the state case so that he

could resolve the federal case first. R112.
On November 1, 2007, Wynn pled guilty in federal court to a single
count of mail fraud.

R208.

The federal government dropped the other

indichnents and agreed not to seek criminal charges against Wynn for the
acts underlying the state charges.

R246-47.

In his federal written plea

statement, Wynn agreed to pay "full restitution in the aggregate amount as
set by the Court. The government contends that the amount is
$15,202,257.68 to the individuals identified in Exhibit 1, in the amounts

identified in Exhibit 1." R246. This part of the written plea agreement was
interlineated by Wynn's counsel. R246, 265. The agreement had originally
set the $15.2 million figure as the final amount. R246, R265-66. Exhibit 1
3

The information in fact names nine theft victims, seven of w horn
were also named as securities fraud victims. Rl-10.
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listed 185 investors, with individual balances ranging from less than $10,000
to over $300,000. R252-55.
Wynn was sentenced on March 17, 2008 to 60 months in federal
prison.

R276-85.

Wynn's counsel had initially sought to continue

sentencing until the parties had reached a firm restitution figure. R276-85,
294-97.

He explained to the court that additional information about

restitution had "been dribbling in here right up 'til last week." R278. But
while he preferred to delay sentencing until they had a final figure, both
Wynn's counsel and the prosecutor believed that, with more time, they
would be able to agree on a final amount. R276-80.
The federal court preliminarily ordered Wynn to pay $15,202,257.68
in restitution, with the understanding that the amount could be amended by
stipulation or, if necessary, after a hearing. R285. The parties agreed that
Wynn could wait 60 days to surrender to federal prison so that he could
give input on the final restitution figure. R276-85.
Wynn's counsel obtained three continuances for Wynn to surrender,
until October 9, 2008, so that they could finalize restitution.

R303-11.

Ultimately, the parties never amended the federal restitution order.
R329-30, 351.

-7-

See

Wynn agreed to pay "many times more'1
than $100,000 in restitution for his state victims.
In August 2008, five months after his federal sentencing, Wynn
reached a plea agreement in his state case. R123-130, R543:2-5. He pled
guilty to two counts of second-degree felony securities fraud and two
counts of third-degree felony securities fraud. R123-30, R543:2-5. The State
dismissed the remaining 13 counts. R543:2.
The parties agreed that Wynn's state prison sentences would run
concurrently to each other and to his five-year federal prison sentence. 4
R130. To ensure that the state prison sentence would run concurrently to
the federal sentence, the trial court agreed to delay issuing a state
commitment until after Wynn was scheduled to begin his federal
commitment, on October 9, 2008. R543:3.
Wynn's state written plea agreement advised him of the potential
maximum prison sentences he faced:

1-to-15 years on the two second-

degree felonies and 0-to-5 years on the two third-degree felonies. R126.

4

The parties apparently obtained the trial court's approval of the plea
and sentencing agreement in advance. See R543:2 (counsel stating
"sentencing as we previously discussed"); R543:3 (court stating "I indicated
to your attorney and the State's attorney that I would accept their
sentencing recommendations"). Rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, allows parties to ask a judge in advance whether he will accept a
proposed disposition.
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Although Wynn was told that his state sentences would run concurrently
with his federal sentence, no one told Wynn that he would not serve any
prison time on the state sentences. R543:2-5.
The parties also agreed that Wynn would pay $100,000 in restitution
at sentencing, with a "final amount of restitution to be determined by
[October 6, 2008] between counsel." R130.

Wynn's counsel assured the

court that he and the prosecutor would "be able to stipulate on the [final
restitution] figure." R543:2-3.
The trial court asked Wynn if he understood that he would be
ordered to pay "full and complete restitution in an amount of at least
$100,000, but probably as your attorney, I think in his words, were many
times more than that," and that the final amount would be based on an
agreed-upon figure to be submitted when Wynn surrendered to federal
prison. R543:3. Wynn replied, "Yes, sir." R543:3.
No one suggested that the restitution amount would be limited to the
victims named in the counts that Wynn pied to or to the victims named in
all the charged counts. R543:2-5. Wynn told the h·ial court that he had
discussed "all the sentencing nuances" of his plea agreement with his
attorney. R543:3-4.
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After accepting Wynn's pleas, the trial court sentenced him to the
agreed-upon statutory prison sentences and ordered him to pay "full and
complete restitution," with the "stipulated amount" to be submitted by
October 6, 2008. R543:5.

Wynn's counsel had over 30 days to object
to the state restitution amount., but did not.
On October 6, 2008, the prosecutor submitted a request for a
restitution order of $782,068.63. R134-35. He attached a list of 23 victims,
with the amount owing to each victim. R138-40. The list included the 11
securities fraud/ theft victims and one of the witness tampering victims
named in the initial information. R138-40; Rl0-11. The prosecutor mailed a
copy of the restitution request to Wynn's attorney on the day that he
submitted it to the court. R136.
But the submitted request also represented that the prosecutor had
already served Wynn's counsel with the proposed restitution figure three
weeks earlier, on September 19, 2008, with a request that counsel contact the
prosecutor if he objected to the figure.

R135.

Wynn's counsel never

contacted the prosecutor. R135.
Nor did Wynn's counsel object to the proposed restitution order after
it was filed with the court, even though the trial court waited 17 days to sign
it. R141-45.
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Five years later, Wynn told a Utah parole hearing officer that
the state-ordered restitution figure sounds correct.
II

11

Wynn was transferred to the Utah State Prison after he completed his
federal five-year sentence. R334-35, 355. Wynn had a parole hearing on
May 2, 2013. R333. The hearing officer told Wynn that her records showed
that he owed $782,068.63 in restitution, that $100,000 of that had already
been paid, and that a balance of $682,068 remained. R339. The hearing
officer asked if her information was correct. Id. Wynn replied, "I haven't
seen those figures, so it sounds correct." Id.
The hearing officer added that it looked like "there were 20 separate
victims with losses ranging from 7,000 to $107,000 each." R340. She asked

if Wynn wanted to add any information to that, or if that "pretty well
sum[med] it up?" Id. Wynn said that he did not have that information in
front of him, but agreed, "I think that sums it up." Id.
Given the large federal and state restitution orders, the hearing officer
expressed concern that Wynn likely would never be able to pay much
toward his restitution obligation. R350-55. The hearing officer also told
Wynn that the Board was crediting his time in federal custody against his
state prison sentence. R355.
Two weeks after the hearing, the Board issued an order setting
Wynn's release date at the expiration of his 15-year sentences. R360. The
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II

order stated that the Board would consider an earlier release date upon
verification of completion of all CAP programming and ... that the
restitution owing is paid in full." Id. The order also stated that the Board's
II

decision was subject to review and modification" at "any time until actual
release from custody." Id.; see also R361-62.

Wynn waited another two years
to challenge his restitution order and sentence.
About two years later, Wynn-represented by new counsel-filed a
motion under rule 22(e) to correct an illegal sentence.

R165-70.

Wynn

asserted that his sentence and restitution order were entered in violation of
his right to the effective assistance of counsel and due process. Id. Wynn
claimed

that

his

sentence

and

the

restitution

amount

were

unconstitutional- and therefore illegal- because they were both "the
product of ineffective assistance of counsel." R174. According to Wynn, it
was "clear" that the parties had agreed that he would not serve any time in
state prison and that counsel should have ensured that he did not. Id. In
support, Wynn attached a declaration from the federal prosecutor, who
stated he believed that the state prosecutor had "planned for the state
sentence to run concurrent with and be identical in length to the federal
sentence." R179-80. Wynn, however, attached no declaration from the state
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prosecutor or his prior counsel about their understanding of the plea
agreement. R179-368.
Wynn also asserted that his sentence was unconstitutional because
the restitution order was "inaccurate" and his counsel had "entirely
forfeited" his right "to an accurate determination of restitution in the state
case." R174-75. Wynn did not suggest that the amounts assigned to each
victim were wrong or that the prosecutor's calculations were wrong; he
instead argued that restitution should have been lhnited to the victims
named in the counts he pled to. R172. Wynn conceded that it was "not
possible to determine from the restitution request and order how much
money he owes as a result of those four counts, because the restitution
amounts are aggregated."

Id.

Wynn suggested, however, that even

accepting those aggregated amounts, he should owe at most only
$183,116.18. Id.
Wynn also attached his own declaration to his motion. R181-186. In
it, he acknowledged that he had expected the restitution calculation in both
the federal and state cases "to be a complicated task" because his businesses
"involved multiple investors," and his bookkeeping was "poor." R181-82.
Wynn nevertheless "counted on" his attorney to figure out restitution after
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he explained "the bookkeeping issues" to counsel and gave him what
"limited records" Wynn had. R182.
Wynn declared that he had never seen "the data underlying the
restitution calculation in state court." R186. Wynn also declared that he
had not agreed to pay more restitution than that owed to the victims of the
counts to which he had pled and that his attorney had never discussed the
matter with him. Id. According to Wynn, he reported to federal prison in
October 2008, "without knowing a final restitution figure in either the
federal or state prosecution." R184.
After the State filed its opposition, Wynn added two alternative
claims in his reply and in a new separate motion. First, he argued that the
restitution amount was a clerical error that could be corrected at any time
under rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R443-44. Second, he
argued that he was entitled to relief from the "default" restitution order
under rule 60(b)(6). R436, 441-43.
At the same time he added these claims, Wynn filed a motion and
request for discovery, seeking documents related not only to his plea
negotiations and restitution, but also for any exculpatory evidence,
investigative reports, criminal histories for Wynn and "any government

-14-

witnesses," and medical and mental health histories that might be in the
prosecution's possession. R445-47.
The State asked the trial court to delay ruling on the discovery motion
until after it ruled on Wynn's rule 22( e), 30(b), and 60(b) motions. R454.
The State pointed out that if those motions were denied, the trial court
would lack jurisdiction to grant relief in the underlying criminal case and
Wynn would then be required to seek relief under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, where he could then seek discovery. Id.

Trial court's ruling denying
rule 30(b), rule 22(e), and rule 60(b) relief
After full briefing and argument, the trial court denied all three of
Wynn's motions. R501-09. The court denied the rule 30(b) claim because
the $782,068.63 restitution amount was not a clerical error. R508. It denied
the rule 22(e) motion because it concluded that an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim did not render an otherwise legal sentence illegal. R503-06. It
denied the rule 60(b) motion because it was untimely and because, under

Kell v. Stnte, 2012 UT 25, if 25, 285 P.3d 1133, Wynn could seek relief only
under the PCRA. R507.
Having concluded that Wynn was not entitled to relief under any of
his theories, it determined that it lacked continuing jurisdiction over the
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criminal case. RS0l, 508. It therefore denied Wynn's request to compel
discovery. R508.
Wynn timely appealed the trial court's ruling. R515.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wynn's rule 30(b), rule 22(e), and rule 60(b) motions all seek to
circumvent the time limits of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. The trial
court recognized and properly rejected that attempt.
Point I. The trial court correctly rejected Wynn's claim that the final

restitution amount was a clerical error under rule 30(b) that could be
corrected at any time. The final restitution order bears none of the hallmarks
of a clerical error. Wynn alleges no mathematical or recording error in the
final ainount. Nor could he. The final restitution amount accurately
reflected the intent of the court and the parties that Wynn pay "full and
complete restitution," based on the "stipulated amount submitted by
October 6th," which Wynn acknowledged would be "many times more"
than $100,000.

At bottom, Wynn's argument is that the final amount

resulted from a legal error- that he cannot be ordered to pay restitution for
conduct he neither pled to nor agreed to be responsible for.

But that

claimed error is judicial- not clerical- in nature and thus cannot be
corrected" at any time" under rule 30(6).
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Point II.

The trial court also properly rejected Wynn's rule 22(e)

claims challenging the length of his prison sentence and the final restitution
amount. In doing so, Wynn argues no illegality in the sentences themselves.
Again, nor could he. The trial court imposed the statutory prison terms and
entered a restitution amount that no objected to. Wynn instead argues that
his prison sentence and the restitution order are unconstitutional- and
therefore

illegal- because

they

were

II

imposed

through

ineffective

assistance of counsel."
Wynn's ineffective assistance challenges are not properly raised
under rule 22(e). To fall under rule 22(e), a sentence must be "patently" or
"manifestly" illegal.

There is nothing "patently" or

II

manifestly" illegal

about a statutory prison term that Wynn stipulated to or about a restitution
order that on its face reflected what the parties had agreed to at sentencing.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly limited constitutional
challenges under rule 22( e) to facial challenges. Wynn's challenge is not a
facial challenge to his sentence, but an as-applied challenge to his counsel's
performance. As such, it cannot be raised under rule 22(e) "at any time."
Point III. The trial court properly denied Wynn's rule 60(b)(6) as an

improper attempt to circumvent the PCRA and as untimely. The h·ial court
correctly determined that it was bound to follow Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25,
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285 P.3d 1133, which expressly held that rule 60(b) may not be used to
circumvent the procedural and time bars of the PCRA. The trial court was
also well within its discretion to find that six-and-one-half years after
judgment was not a reasonable time to bring a rule 60(b)(6) motion.
Point IV. The trial court properly denied Wynn's discovery motion

once it concluded that the final restitution amount was not a clerical error,
that the restitution order and prison sentences were not illegal, and that
Wynn could not challenge his sentence under rule 60(b). At that point, the
trial court lacked continuing jurisdiction to do anything more in the
criminal case.

ARGUMENT
Wynn's motions below and his arguments on appeal are nothing
more than a transparent attempt to skirt the statutory time limits-which
have long since expired-for collaterally challenging his sentence. Wynn
had, but neglected, adequate and exclusive remedies under the PostConviction Re1nedies Act. But since his clailns would be barred under the
PCRA, he has tried to shoehorn his substantive collateral challenges into
inapplicable procedural remedies.

The trial court here recognized and

properly rejected that attempt.
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I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
FINAL UNOBJECTED-TO RESTITUTION FIGURE WAS
NOT A CLERICAL MIST AKE UNDER RULE 30(B)

Once a trial court "imposes a valid sentence" and enters a final
judgment, it "ordinarily loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case."

State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,I13, 218 P.3d 610 (citing State v. Montoya, 825
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991)). A defendant wishing to challenge a valid
sentence must timely appeal, see Montoya, 825 P.2d at 678-79, or timely seek
relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), see Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-9-101,

et. seq.; Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a). See also State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15,

~20, 274 P.3d 919.
A trial court, however, does have continuing jurisdiction in the
underlying criminal case to correct a clerical error "at any time" under rule
30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Wynn missed the deadlines to appeal his restitution order, see Utah R.
App. 4(a) (30-day time limit for appeal), or to seek post-conviction relief, see
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (one-year time limit from date cause of action
accrued). Wynn thus invokes rule 30(b) to modify the $782,000 restitution
figure as a mere clerical error. See Br. Aplt. 12-22.
But the restitution order here bears none of the hallmarks of a clerical
error. Wynn alleges no recording or mathematical error apparent on the
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face of the record. He contends only that the trial court could not, as a
matter of law, order him to pay restitution for conduct he neither pled to
nor agreed to be responsible for. Br. Aplt. 14-18. But that kind of error-the
result of judicial reasoning-is the antithesis of a clerical error. The trial
court thus rightly concluded that the restitution amount was not a clerical
error under rule 30(b), and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to
modify it.
A.

A clerical error is a mechanical recording mistake that results
in a judgment that does not reflect the court's actual intent.

"Clerical 1nistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time .... " Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b).
"' A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment [or order] that
results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual
intention of the court."' State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,Il5, 218 P.3d 610
(quoting Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah
1989)).

A clerical mistake is "mechanical in nature," "apparent on the

record," and "does not involve a legal decision or judgment" by the court.

Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The goal of rule 30(b) is "to
correct clerical errors so that the record reflects what was actually 'done or
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intended."' Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,J14 (quoting Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002
UT 36, if 30, 48 P.3d 218).
Examples of clerical errors include mathematical miscalculationswhether by a party, clerk, judge, or jury; transcription errors in recording
the judgment; and a judge's misstatement in pronouncing sentence.

See,

e.g., Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,J,J15-34 (prosecutor's miscalculation of
restitution); Bishop, 2002 UT 36, if if 6, 32 Qury's miscalculation of damage
award); Stanger, 669 P.2d at 1206 (prevailing party's miscalculation of
damages); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, (Utah 1988) (court clerk mistranscribed announced by court); State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, if ,I10-16,
322 P.3d 1184 Gudge intended to impose consecutive sentences, but
inadvertently a1mounced and entered concurrent sentences).
A clerical error-which a court may correct at any time-is different
fron1 a judicial error-which it may not. Thomas A. Paulson, Co., 770 P.2d at
130.

The distinction '" depends on whether [the error] was made in

rendering the judgment [a judicial error] or in recording the judgment as
rendered [a clerical error]."' Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,I14 (quoting Bishop,
2002 UT 36, if 32) (emphasis added); see also Thomas A. Paulson, Co., 707 P.2d
II

at 130. Unlike a clerical error, which results in a judgment that does not
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conform to the actual intention of the court," a judicial error in rendering
the judgment "results in a substantively incorrect judgment." Id.
In assessing whether an error is clerical as opposed to judicial, Utah
courts have generally focused on three things: "(1) whether the order or
judgment that was rendered reflects what was done or intended, (2)
whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and decision making,
and (3) whether the error is clear from the record." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62,
if14.

B.

The restitution amount was not a recording mistake and its
entry reflected the actual intent of the court.

Under the foregoing standard, nothing about the restitution order
here looks like a clerical error. Wynn does not allege a mathematical or
recording error.

Br. Aplt. 15-22. He instead alleges that the restitution

amount is the result of a legal error- that he cannot be ordered to pay
restitution for conduct he neither pied to nor agreed to be responsible for.
Br. Aplt. 16-17. That claimed error is judicial-not clerical-in nature.
1. The restitution order reflected the intent of the court and
parties that Wynn pay "many times more" than $100,000.

First, as the trial court found, the order "reflects what was done or
intended." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, if 14. As a tenn of his plea agreement,
Wynn agreed to pay restitution in an amount "to be detennined by Oct. 6,
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08 between counsel." R130; see also R543:3. Wynn said he understood that
his final restitution would be "many times more" than the $100,000 he paid
II

at sentencing. R543:3. The trial court expressed its intent to order full and
complete restitution," based on the

II

stipulated amount submitted by

October 6th." R543:5. The trial court fulfilled its expressed intent-and that
of the parties-when it signed the final restitution order submitted by the
prosecutor.
Wynn asserts that the record cannot "properly" be "read as indicating
that [the trial court] intended to enter an order for restitution beyond
anything that Wynn agreed to." Br. Aplt. 15. Wynn argues that Utah law
11

allows for criminal restitution only for damages from offenses of

conviction unless there is an agreement by the defendant to pay restitution
beyond the offenses of conviction." Br. Aplt. 16. According to Wynn, he
11

did not agree to pay restitution to people other than the victims of the

counts pied to." Br. Aplt. 17. In support, Wynn cites only his long-afterthe-fact declaration, which he attached to his motion to set aside the
restitution order. Id.
Wynn does not properly read the record. The only agreement on the
record was that Wynn would pay restitution in an amount to be determined
by counsel, and that the amount would likely be "many times more" than

-23-

$100,000. R130; R543:3-5. No one, including Wynn, ever suggested that the
final amount would be limited to the victims named in the counts pled to or
charged.

R543:3-5.

Rather, the parties clearly expressed that the final

restitution would be based on counsel's future agreement.
Indeed, Wynn's argument is at odds with his own expressed
anticipation that the final amount would be "many times more" than
$100,000. Wynn now asserts that he owed only $138,116.18 to the victims
named in the counts pled to and a total of $184,526 if the victims in all the
charged counts are included. Br. Aplt. 27. Neither of those figures is "many
times 1nore" than $100,000; they are not even one times more. The final
$782,000 figure, however, is "many times" more. 5
Wynn's claim that he did not agree to the final restitution amount is
also at odds with what he told the parole hearing officer, five years later.
When the hearing officer asked him about the accuracy of the $782,000
restitution order, Wynn said that it "sounds correct." R339. And when the

5

Wynn's calculations of what he would owe to victims named in the
case are incorrect. He bases his calculations on the figures alleged in the
infonnation. The information, however, did not purport to set out final and
accurate restitution figures. Under the updated figures attached to the final
restitution order, Wynn owes $266,526.18 if all the fraud and theft victims
named in the information are included; he owes an additional $50,000 if the
named victim from the dismissed witness tampering count is included. See
R144-45.

-24-

hearing officer said that 20 victims were listed, "with losses ranging from
7,000 to $107,000 each," Wynn said, "I think that sums it up."

R340.

Wynn's lack of surprise at and his ratification of the $782,000 figure support
the conclusion that Wynn agreed to the restitution amount as ordered.
Counsel's silence when the restitution order was submitted does not
change that conclusion.

If anything, counsel's silence - on this record -

affirmatively supports it. First, absent contrary evidence, this Court must
presume that counsel reasonably chose not to object because the proposed
restitution was accurate and Wynn had agreed to pay it as part of his plea
agreement. See Burt v. Titl01L1, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (" absence of evidence
cannot overcome the 'strong presumption that counsel's conduct [fell]
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance"') (quoting

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). Wynn offered nothing
below-such as his counsel's declaration-to support his assumption that
counsel's silence was due to negligence instead of a conscious decision. See

Fairchild v. Workman, 279 F.3d 1134, (10th Cir. 2009) ("Only in the most
exceptional circumstances will we issue the writ without allowing counsel
an opportunity to explain his conduct.").
Second, everything in this record supports the conclusion that
counsel did not object to the restitution amount because Wynn had agreed
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to it. The record shows that Wynn's counsel was on top of the restitution
issue from the beginning. Counsel diligently sought to reach stipulated
restitution amounts in both the federal and state prosecutions. He raised
the issue at both sentencings and rather than blindly agreeing to the
amounts, sought more time to review restitution. See, e.g., Rl 12, 130, 246-67,
265, 276-85, 303-11; R543:2-3. Indeed, counsel tried to continue the federal
~

sentencing and thrice continued Wynn's surrender date solely for the
purpose of resolving restitution with Wynn's input. R276-85, 303-11. All
<ii;..,

this belies Wynn's unsupported claim now that his counsel negligently
allowed the final state restitution order to be entered without Wynn's input
or approval.
In sum, all the record evidence shows that the final restitution order
reflected not only the court's intent, but also Wynn's intent.
2. The restitution figure resulted from judicial reasoning
and decision making, not from a mathematical or
transcription error.

As stated, Wynn does not claim that the final restitution amount
stemmed from miscalculation. He instead asserts a legal claim: that the
final amount unlawfully included victims and amounts that he had not
agreed to reimburse. Br. Aplt. 16-17. Recognizing and resolving a legal
issue- or failing to do so- necessarily requires judicial reasoning.
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See

Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,I25-27.

And erroneously deciding a legal claim

results in a substantive-or judicial-error, not a clerical one. See id. at if 14.
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court engages in
judicial reasoning just by setting restitution-even when it is agreed uponand accepting the figures presented by a party. Id. at if if 25-27. In Rodrigues,
a criminal non-support prosecution, the parties agreed that the defendant
would pay child support arrearages from a certain date through the
sentencing date. Id. at if 26. The trial court accepted the arrearage figures as
presented by the State, which turned out to have been miscalculated in
Rodrigues' s favor. Id.
The Rodrigues court held that the trial court's "determination of
restitution" and its acceptance of "the figures presented by the State,"
I,..\

Viii

required "judicial reasoning and decision making." Id. at if25-27. This is
because a trial court "has discretion to adjust the amount of restitution
agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement." 6

Id. at if26.

Rodrigues

nevertheless held that the erroneous restitution amount was a clerical error

6

Rodrigues adds the caveat that "any adjustment must fall within the
'conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of
[the] plea agreement."' Id. at if 26 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)
(2008)) (brackets in Rodrigues). The h·ial court here made no adjustment to
the submitted restitution amount, but if it had, that too would have resulted
from judicial decision-making.
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because, based on the State's miscalculation, the court had "erroneously
entered an amount of restitution that did not conform to its judicial
determination." Id. at ,I26. In other words, the clerical error in Rodrigues
resulted not from the court's judicial reasoning, but from the State's
mathematical miscalculation. Id. at ,I27.
Here, like in Rodrigues, the trial court engaged in judicial reasoning
when it decided to accept the parties' restitution agreement and to adopt the
final unobjected-to restitution order as submitted by the State. But, unlike
in Rodrigues, no one here has claimed that the submitted amount was based
on a mathematical miscalculation. Rather, as stated, Wynn argues only that
the trial court could not legally order him to pay restitution beyond that to
which he had agreed. Br. Aplt. 16-17.
Wynn also argues that it is "clear that the restitution order is not the
product of determination by counsel but was instead a default order,"
which required him to pay restitution for conduct he had not agreed to. Br.
Aplt. 19. But while the parties' intent "may be taken into account in the
clerical error analysis," ultimately, it is "the intent of the court or fact finder
that is binding." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,IlS (emphasis added). As stated,
the clear intent of the trial court here was to enter the restitution amount
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that the parties agreed to. The trial court carried out that intent when it
signed the final order.
And, as explained, the trial court here had every reason to believe
that the final restitution order was "the product of determination by
counsel," as opposed to a default order. Counsel represented to the trial
court that by October 6th, he would reach a final restitution figure with the
prosecutor that would be "many times more" than $100,000; the prosecutor
submitted a final restitution figure that fit that bill by the promised date;
and counsel never objected to the final figure, even though it had been
served on him more than a month before the trial court signed it.
In sum, the trial court's entry of the final restitution order was based
on judicial reasoning and decision making and was therefore not a clerical
error.
3. No error is clear from the record.

Wynn argues that "the erroneous nature" of the restitution order "is
clear from the record, for it does not reflect the agreement of Wynn, one of
the two parties who should have been in agreement before the court signed
the order." Br. Aplt. 20. Thus, in Wynn's view, his own lack of explicit
approval of the figures equate to explicit contradiction of the prosecution's
figures.
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But, again, the only agreement "clear from the record" is that Wynn
agreed to pay full restitution in an amount to be determined by his counsel
and the prosecutor and that everyone anticipated that the final amount
would be "many times more" than $100,000.

Nothing was said about

limiting the final amount to victims named in the counts pled to or charged.
And the final order fell squarely within what the parties had represented to
the trial court. And counsel-who had more than a month to do so-never
objected to the proposed order. Given the prosecutor's request for input
from counsel, the court could justifiably rely on counsel's silence as
indicating his assent to the prosecutor's figures. And Wynn's later
ratification of the final restitution a1nount gives after-the-fact confirmation
that it was not in error.
In sum, nothing in the record suggests any error in the final
restitution amount, let alone a clerical one. The trial court thus properly
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concluded that the final restitution amount was not a clerical error under
rule 30(b) and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to modify it. 7
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
STATUTORY PRISON SENTENCE AND THE FINAL
RESTITUTION AMOUNT WERE NOT PATENTLY OR
MANIFESTLY ILLEGAL UNDER RULE 22(E)

A trial court also retains continuing jurisdiction to "correct an illegal
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(e). But rule 22(e) does not confer continuing jurisdiction on a
trial court to entertain collateral attacks on a plea, conviction, or valid
sentence. See State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, ~4, 148 P.3d 990; State v. Brooks,
908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995); Montoya, 825 P.2d at 279. A defendant must
pursue those attacks through a timely petition under the PCRA. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(1) (stating that PCRA "establishes the sole remedy
for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal
7

Wynn also asserts that the final restitution order is "clearly
erroneous because it does not account for or give [him] credit for the
$100,000 in restitution he had paid at the time he pied and was sentenced."
Br. Aplt. 20. But the order correctly sets out "the amount of full restitution"
that Wynn had agreed to pay. R141. Wynn's $100,000 payment does not
make that final figure incorrect; it merely reduces how much he still owes.
And it appears that both the Board and the trial court have credited that
payment against the final restitution amount. See R502 (trial court's ruling
noting that final restitution figure included the $100,000 plus an additional
$682,068); R339-40 (parole hearing officer noting that Wynn owes
$682,086.63 in restitution).
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offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct
appeal"); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a) ("The [PCRA] sets forth the manner and
extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction
and sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a
direct appeal ... or the time to file such an appeal has expired."). To be
timely; Wynn had to file his collateral attack on the judgment within one
year after his time to appeal expired. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107(2)(a).
Again, having missed the deadline to appeal or file a post-conviction
petition, Wynn argues that his statutory prison sentence and restitution
order were illegal within the meaning of rule 22(e). Br. Aplt. 22-34. Wynn
asserts that his prison sentence and restitution order are unconstitutionaland therefore illegal- because they were
assistance of counsel."

Br. Aplt. 23-24.

II

imposed through ineffective

Regarding his prison sentence,

II

Wynn contends that it is clear that the parties agreed" he "would serve no
time in the Utah State Prison as a result of his pleas in the state case," and
that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not ensuring that this
agreement was carried out. Br. Aplt. 27-28. Regarding the restitution order,
Wynn contends that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
defaulting on the final restitution order because Wy1m had never agreed "to
pay restitution for anything beyond the counts he pled to." Br. Aplt. 26.

-32-

Wynn's allegations are not properly raised under rule 22(e). To fall
within rule 22(e), a sentence must be ''patently" or "manifestly" illegal.

State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ~9, 232 P.3d 1008. There is nothing "patently"
or "manifestly" illegal about a statutory prison term that Wynn stipulated
to or about a restitution order that on its face reflected what the parties had
agreed to at sentencing.
And a claim that counsel was ineffective during the plea and
sentencing process does not render a facially valid sentence illegal within
the meaning of rule 22(e). Indeed, such a claim goes not to whether the
sentence is illegal, but to whether it was erroneous. The trial court thus
properly ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over Wynn's claims under
rule 22(e).
A. Rule 22(e) applies only to patently or manifestly illegal
sentences.

Because rule 22(e) allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any
time, the Utah Supreme Court has "narrowly circumscribed" its reach "to
prevent abuse." State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ,IS, 48 P.3d 228. The concern is
that a broad construction of the rule would "sanction a fact-intensive
challenge to the legality of a sentencing proceeding asserted long after the
time for raising it in the initial h·ial or direct appeal." State v. Prion, 2012 UT
15, if 20. "A parallel challenge to the proceeding leading to a defendant's
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conviction, after all, would be time-barred, see generally Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-106,-107, and it would make little
sense to elevate challenges to sentencing proceedings over parallel
challenges to the guilt phase of a trial." Id.
Rule 22(e), therefore, has been limited to "patently or manifestly"
illegal sentences.

Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ,I9.

A "patently or manifestly"

illegal sentence is one that is '" ambiguous with respect to the time and
manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term
required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the
sentence, or is a sentence which the judg1nent of conviction did not
authorize."' Id. at ,f 12 (quoting State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,I13, 203 P.3d
984)). Typically, such a sentence occurs when "the sentencing court has no
jurisdiction" or "when the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory
range. State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, if 15, 84 P.3d 854.
A sentence may also be illegal under rule 22(e)
unconstitutional.

if it is

Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ,Ill; Prion, 2012 UT 15, ,I,I21-24;

State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, iliI20-26. Even so, not all constitutional attacks
on a sentence may be brought under rule 22(e). Houston, 2015 UT 40, 'if 21;

Prion, 2012 UT 15, if21. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court has limited such
attacks to "facial constitutional challenges to the sentence that do not
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implicate a fact-intensive analysis."

Houston, 2015 UT 40, if 18. In other

words, the constitutional challenge must "attack the sentence itself and not
the underlying conviction," and it must "do so as a facial challenge rather
than an as-applied inquiry." Houston, 2015 UT 40, if26 (emphasis added).
The reason for Houston's limitation is to prevent the abuse that may come
from being able to challenge an illegal sentence at any time. Id. at if 23.

Houston gave several examples of facial challenges that could be
appropriately brought under rule 22(e), such as a challenge to the
indeterminate sentencing scheme under Utah's separation of powers clause;
a claim that the sentence violated the cruel and unusual punishment clauses
of the federal and state constitutions, "but only to the extent that the
defendant argue[s] for 'a per se violation'"; or a claim that the sentence
violated double jeopardy. Id. at if ,I24, 26 (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51,

Prion, 2012 UT 15,

,r ,r 23-24).

Those challenges attack

Ill

if if3-7;

facial defects"' that

can '"easily be corrected without the need for factual development in the
original trial court."' Id. at if 24.

Houston also cited an example of an inappropriate rule 22(e)
constitutional challenge: "claims brought under the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution," because "those clauses [do] not relate to sentencing." Id. at
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if26 (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, if 6). Other examples, of course, include u asapplied" constitutional challenges because they, unlike facial challenges,
require the court to "delve into the record or make findings of fact." Id. at
if 26, 27.
B.

The statutory prison sentences and restitution order are not
patently or manifestly illegal.

The trial court here rightly concluded that Wynn's statutory prison
sentence and restitution order are not patently or manifestly illegal. Indeed,
both are facially valid.
1. Prison sentence challenge.

As a threshold matter, Wynn argues no illegality in the sentences
themselves. Br. Aplt. 22-33. Nor could he. The trial court imposed the
prison terms permitted by statute:

1-to-15 years on the second-degree

felonies and 0-to-5 years on the third-degree felonies. And Wynn expressly
agreed to those statutory prison terms. R126, 130; R543:2-5. The trial court
also exercised its discretion to run the sentences concurrently to each other
and to the federal sentence, as the parties requested. R543:2-5; R130. Thus,
Wynn's prison sentences are facially valid.
Wynn instead argues that his prison sentence is illegal because the
parties' plea agreement conten1plated that he "would serve no time in the
Utah State Prison as a result of his pleas in the state case," and his counsel
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was ineffective for not ensuring that this intent was carried out by asking
the court to impose probation instead of prison or by seeking a reduction of
the second-degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-402.

Br.

Aplt. 27-28. Wynn reasons that his counsel's ineffectiveness rendered his
facially-valid prison sentence unconstitutional and therefore illegal under
rule 22(e). Id. at 23-25.
Wynn's "constitutional" challenge to his prison sentence is precisely
the kind of challenge that Houston forbids. First, it is not a facial challenge
to his sentence or to the statute under which he was sentenced. It is instead
an as-applied challenge to his counsel's constitutional performance in
procuring the facially-valid sentence. Such a claim is not a purely legal one
that a court can resolve without further factual development.

Rather,

ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed questions of law and fact.

See, e.g., State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, if 8, 285 P.3d 1183. As such, they do
not attack "facial defects" that can "easily be corrected without the need for
factual development in the original trial court." Prion, 2012 UT 15, ,124.
Ineffective assistance of counsel challenges to a sentence, therefore, could
never be the kind of constitutional challenges allowed under rule 22( e ), and
Utah courts have never resorted to rule 22(e) to remedy a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Indeed, allowing an ineffective assistance challenge to a sentence u at
any time" would invite the very abuse that Houston sought to prevent. A
defendant could potentially turn every facially legal sentence into a
"patently or manifestly" illegal one merely by alleging that his counsel was
unconstitutionally ineffective during the sentencing process.

Cf State v.

Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, iJ13, 167 P.3d 1046 ("Asa practical matter, there is no
alleged flaw in a guilty plea of a defendant represented by counsel that
could not be attributed in some way to deficient representation."). If that
were the rule, rule 22( e) would effectively have no limits.
Wynn's challenge to his sentence is improperly brought under rule
22(e) for another reason. Although he denies it, see Br. Aplt. 23, Wynn's
challenge ultimately goes to the validity of his plea, not to the legality of his
sentence. Wynn essentially asserts that he agreed to plead guilty on the
understanding that any prison time served on state convictions would not
exceed the five years imposed on his federal convictions. See Br. Aplt. 27.
That, at best, alleges only a misunderstanding of the plea terms. It does not
allege an error in the sentences that the trial court can correct.
"Although

sentencing

is

a

judicial

function,

under

Utah's

indeterminate sentencing scheme, the Board fixes the number of years to be
served and grants parole within its sole discretion." State v. Thurman, 2014
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UT App 119, if4 n.3. See also Kelly v. Bard of Pardons, 2012 UT App 279, ,I,134, 288 P.3d 39, 41 (Board has non-reviewable constitutional authority to
determine if and when a prison may be granted parole). Thus, the trial
court here could limit Wynn's prison term to five years only by converting
the second-degree pleas into third-degree pleas. But that would require a
change to the pleas. And a defendant may not challenge his pleas under
rule 22(e). See Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, if 4; Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860.
In sum, Wynn's challenge to his prison sentence is improper under
rule 22(e). 8

8

In any event, Wynn could not overcome Strickland's strong
presumption that his counsel's performance was objectively reasonable or
that any deficient performance did not prejudice him. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690. Nothing in the record supports Wynn's claim that the parties
and the court all intended that he would serve no time on his state
convictions. This Court may not rely on the absence of record evidence to
find counsel ineffective. See Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013). But the
record shows the opposite, anyway. Wynn knowingly pled to two seconddegree felonies with statutory prison terms of 1 to 15 years. Wynn was thus
on notice that even if his sentences ran concurrently with his five-year
federal sentence, he potentially faced an additional 10 years in state prison.
If, as Wynn claims, the parties had all truly intended that he serve no prison
time on his state sentences, they could have ensured that intent by allowing
hiin to plead guilty only to third-degree felonies. Yet they did not. And
while Wynn faults his counsel for not seeking other solutions- such as
asking for probation or a 402 reduction, Br. Aplt. 27-28-he proffers no facts
or authority that counsel have unilaterally achieved those results without
the prosecutor's agreement. Telling, Wynn offered no declaration from the
state prosecutor or his counsel that such an agreement was even possible.
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2. Restitution amount challenge.

Wynn's rule 22(e) challenge to the restitution order suffers from the
same flaws as his prison sentence and rule 30(b) challenges. Wynn argues
that his sentence is "unconstitutional because the restitution ordered is
inaccurate, and trial counsel was ineffective in entirely forfeiting Wynn's
right to an accurate determination of restitution in the state case." Br. Aplt.
25.
As explained, Wy1m's "constitutional" challenge is not a proper one
under rule 22(e) because it does not involve a facial challenge to the
restitution award. Rather, Wynn presents a fact-intensive challenge to his
counsel's 01nission of an objection to the final restitution order.
In sum, Wynn has not shown that the final restitution order was
illegal under rule 22( e). 9

9

Wy1m also could not prevail on an ineffective assistance claiin
regarding his restitution. First, as explained in Point I, Wynn has not shown
that the final restitution is inaccurate, let alone that counsel was ineffective
for not objecting to it. Second, Wynn proffered nothing below to prove that
his counsel performed objectively unreasonably when he did not object to
the final restitution order. Absent any contrary evidence, this Court must
presume counsel's effectiveness. See Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 17. And, as explain in
Point I, everything in this record supports that presumption.
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED WYNN'S RULE
60(B)(6) MOTION BOTH AS UNTIMELY AND AS AN
IMPROPER ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE PCRA

Wynn alternatively sought to have his restitution order set aside
under rule 60(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Wynn argues that the
trial court erred in deciding that his rule 60(b)(6) motion was untimely and
an improper bid to circumvent the requirements of the PCRA. Br. Aplt. 3444.
A.

The trial court properly denied the rule 60(b) motion as an
improper attempt to circumvent the PCRA.

The trial court relied on Kell v. State to conclude that Wynn could not
use rule 60(b) to challenge the final restitution amount. R506-08. The Utah
Supreme Court held in Kell that a rule 60(b) motion may not be brought in
an attempt to evade the requirements of the PCRA. Kell v. State, 2012 UT 15,
,125-30, 285 P.3d 1133. Thus, when the PCRA is in direct conflict with rule
60(b), the movant must proceed under the PCRA. Id.
The PCRA "establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges
a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all
other legal remedies including a direct appeal .... " Utah Code Ann. § 78B9-102(1).

The PCRA replaced "all prior remedies for review, including

extraordinary or common law writs." Id.
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The Utah Supreme Court, through its rulemaking authority, has
mandated that Utah courts must apply the PCRA to the exclusion of all
other remedies for collaterally attacking a criminal judgment. Utah R. Civ.
P. 65C(a) (stating that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and extent to which
a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and sentence
after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal ...
or the time to file such an appeal has expired").
And the supreme court has followed that mandate consistently. The

Kell court, for example, held that "rule 60(b) may not circumvent conflicting
statutory mandates if a statute occupies the field that would otherwise be
controlled by rule 60(b)."

Kell, 2012 UT 25, if28. Thus, while rule 60(b)

"might be an appropriate avenue when the motion does not attempt to
achieve relief that the PCRA would bar," rule 60(b) cannot act "as a
substitute for a prohibited postconviction petition." Id.
The PCRA "occupies the field" in which Wynn seeks relief. Wynn's
rule 60(b) motion sought relief from the restitution part of his sentence
based on a claim that its enh·y resulted from his counsel's alleged
ineffectiveness. R441-42. As stated, the PCRA is "the sole remedy" for a
person to challenge a "sentence for a criminal offense" after he "has
exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal." Utah Code
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Ann.§ 78B-9-102(1). And the PCRA gives petitioners an express remedy for
a sentence that resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. § 78B-9104(1)(a), (d). Because Wynn did not timely appeal his sentence, he had to
pursue his challenge to that sentence under the PCRA and be subject to any
time or procedural bars. See Id. § 78B-9-106, -107.
Wynn contends that he is "not trying to circumvent the PCRA." Br.
Aplt. 41. "Rather," he asserts, "he is trying to obtain relief from a default
judgment that entered through ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Id.
But that is precisely the kind of claim that the PCRA covers. Id. § 78B-9104 (1) (a), (d).
Wynn suggests that Kell's holding does not apply to him because the
State "has never contended the PCRA would bar [his] claims for relief." Br.
Aplt. 41.

The State, however, cannot be expected to raise time and

procedural bars under the PCRA when Wynn has yet to file a PCRA
petition. And it is very likely that Wynn's challenge to his sentence six-anda-half years after the fact would be foreclosed by the PCRA' s one-year
limitations period and its procedural default provisions.

See Utah Code

Ann.§ 78B-9-107 (petitioner has one year after "cause of action has accrued"
to file petition); id. § 78B-9-106 (setting out procedural bars).
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In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that Wynn's rule 60(b)
motion was an improper attempt to evade the requirements of the PCRA. 10
B.

The trial court also properly found that six-and-one-half years
after judgment was not a reasonable time to bring a rule
60(b) (6) motion.

Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a trial court, "in the
furtherance of justice," and "upon such terms as are just," to "relieve a party
... from a final judgment" for five specified reasons, including (1) excusable
neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence, (3) fraud, (4) a void judgment, (5) a
satisfied judgment, or (6) "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment."
motion under subsection (6). 11

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
R440-44.

Wynn brought his

A motion under the first three

subsections (excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud) must
be brought within three months after the judgment was entered. Id.

A

I0

The trial court also questioned whether it was even proper to file a
rule 60(b) motion in a criminal case. R506 n.2. The trial court noted that Kell
and the other cases cited below all dealt with rule 60(b) motions in PCRA
actions, "which are civil in nature." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Kell, 2012
UT 253; Menzies, 2006 UT 81; Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, 342 P.3d 182). The
trial court acknowledged that civil procedural rules "may apply in criminal
cases 'where there is no other applicable statute or rule."' R506 n.2 (quoting
Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e)). But here it appeared that "both Rule 22(e)," and the
"PCRA" were "applicable to address [Wynn's] allegations." R506 n.2. The
trial court ultimately did not answer that question because it resolved the
case under Kell.
II

Below, Wynn also alleged that subsection (1), excusable neglect,
applied, but he withdrew that argument in his reply memorandum. R479.
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motion under the remaining subsections must be made "within a reasonable
time." Id.
That standard requires a party to have" acted diligently once the basis
for the relief became available, and that the delay in seeking relief did not
cause undue hardship to the opposing party."

Crane-Jenkins v. Mikarose,

LLC, 2015 UT App 270, if12, 799 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (quotation marks and

citation omitted). What constitutes a reasonable time under rule 60(b)(6)
will depend on '" the facts of each case, considering such factors as the
interest in finality, the reason for the delay, the practical ability of the
litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to the
other parties."' Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ~65, 150 P.3d 480 (quoting
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,435 (Utah 1993)).

The trial court here found that Wynn did "not appear to have acted
diligently" in pursuing a "possible relief from judgment."

R507.

The

record-and even Wynn's own declaration-supported that finding. The
restitution order was entered on October 6, 2008.

Wynn filed his 60(b)

motion in March 2015, almost six-and-one-half years later. Wynn asserted
that he first learned about the final restitution amount at his May 2013
parole hearing. R184-186; R544:5. But he did not explain why he could not
have learned of the restitution order before then. Indeed, his statement at
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the parole hearing that the restitution amount "sounds correct," suggested
that he did in fact know of it earlier. More importantly, even assuming that
he did not, and could not with reasonable diligence, learn of the order
sooner, he never explained why he waited for nearly another two years to
file his 60(b) motion. That was reason alone for the h·ial court to find that
the motion was not filed within a "reasonable time." See Crane-Jenkins, 2015
UT App 270, ,I12 (rule 60(b)' s "reasonable time" standard requires movant
to act" diligently once the basis for the relief became available").
Wynn argues that the reason for his delay was that "no one
provided" him "with a copy of the default restitution order or advised him
as to its illegal nature until present counsel went to dish·ict court and copied
the order and mailed it" to him "in December of 2014." Br. Aplt. 38. But
Wynn admits that he learned of the final restitution order and amount at the
parole hearing more than 18 months before then. He does not explain why
he could not have, with reasonable diligence, procured a copy of the order
sooner.

Even after obtaining the copy, he waited another three months to

file his 60(b) motion.

And he cannot pin the reasonableness of his own

diligence on his current counsel later telling him that the order was illegal.

Cf Brown v. State, 2015 UT App 254, iliJ9-10, 361 P.3d 124 (holding under
PCRA statute of limitations that "reasonable diligence" does not depend on
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r,;,:,

when petitioner "recognizes" the "legal significance" of known facts)
(quotations and citations omitted). Even if he could, he does not show that
it was reasonable to wait so long to obtain that advice.
Wynn also faults the trial court for not expressly addressing the
"interest in finality" and "prejudice to the other parties" factors, which he
says should be resolved in his favor. 12

Br. Aplt. 37-40. As explained,

however, rule 60(b)'s "reasonable time" standard requires that the movant
act" diligently once the basis for the relief became available." Crane-Jenkins,
2015 UT App 270, ~12. Once the trial court found that Wynn had not acted
diligently in pursuing rule 60(b) relief, it did not have to consider other
factors to conclude that his motion was not filed within a reasonable time.
And Wy1m is wrong that the State has no interest in the finality of his
restitution order or that it would not be prejudiced by the order being set
aside six-and-one-half years after its entry. The State entered into a plea
agreement with Wynn in which it dismissed 13 felony counts in exchange
for his pleas to four counts and an agree1nent to pay full restitution, which

12

Wynn also complains that the trial court did not consider the factors
of "reason for delay" and "practical ability to learn of grounds earlier." Br.
Aplt. 36-39. The trial court's discussion of Wynn's lack of diligence,
however, addressed those factors and resolved them against him. See R507
(noting that Wynn gave no reasons or rationale for his delay in learning of
the restitution order and filing his rule 60(b) motion).
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as Wynn acknowledged at his plea hearing, would be "many times more"
than $100,000.
Setting aside the final restitution order would remove a material term
of the plea agreement and permanently deprive the State of the benefit of its
bargain. And doing so would oblige the State to reinvestigate and re-prove
the victims' complicated losses using stale evidence many years removed.
Under these circumstances, a defendant could be confident that the
provable amount would be lower for no other reason that document
spoilage. Granting Wynn's requested relief would incentivize defendants to
lull the victims and prosecution into a false sense of finality by tacitly
approving the restitution order, only to cray foul after enough time has
passed that the evidence will no longer support the award. That kind of
gamesmanship is the precise evil that rule 60(b)'s reasonable diligence
requirement bars.
Wynn asserts that the State's interest in the finality of the restitution
order is not served so long as he is in prison and unable to work toward
paying his restitution. Br. Aplt. 38-40. Wynn is right that the State has an
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interest in having Wynn pay his agreed-upon restitution. But setting aside
or reducing his restitution order would thwart, not serve, that interest. 13
In sum, the trial court was well within its discretion in deciding that
Wynn's rule 60(b)(6) motion was not brought within a reasonable time.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED WYNN'S
DISCOVERY MOTION AFTER IT DETERMINED THAT IT
LACKED
JURISDICTION
TO
CONSIDER
HIS
CHALLENGES TO HIS SENTENCE

Wynn finally argues that the trial court erred in denying his discovery
motion on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. Br. Aplt. 45-46.
Wynn reasons that because the trial court had jurisdiction "to consider its
own jurisdiction," it necessarily had jurisdiction to order discovery.

Br.

Aplt. 44 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

13

Wynn also asserts that the State would not be prejudiced by rule
60(b) relief because "the State's interest is for its prosecutors to integriously
[sic] honor both the letter and the spirit of the plea agreement." Br. Aplt. at
40. The State is well aware of its professional and ethical obligations to
honor its plea agreements and it takes those obligations seriously. The State
disputes, however, Wynn's take on "the letter and the spirit of the plea
agreement." As explained, the only agreement on the record is that Wynn
agreed to pay full restitution in an amount to be agreed upon by the
attorneys and that he anticipated that the amount would be "many times
more" than $100,000. There is nothing dishonest or unethical about wanting
to hold a criminal defendant to the letter and spirit of his agreement with
the State.
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But once the trial court concluded that the final restitution amount
was not a clerical error, that the restitution order and prison sentences were
not illegal, and that Wynn could not challenge his sentence under rule 60(b),
the trial correctly determined that it lacked continuing jurisdiction to do
anything in the criminal case- including ordering discovery. See State v.

Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991) (once a trial court "imposes a
valid sentence and final judgment is entered," it "loses subject matter
jurisdiction over the case").

Once a court has determined that it lacks

jurisdiction, it "retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-

Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989).
The h·ial court therefore properly denied the discovery 1notion.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on April 4, 2016.
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ADDENDUM A
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes
and Rules

Utah R. Crim. P. Rule Rule 22. Sentence, Judgment and Commitment

(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a
time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after
the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter
bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be
given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defend-

ant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the
defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be
filed.
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in
writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the
plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall
deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's
return on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner,
at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in

accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a
mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-16a-202(1)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order.

Utah R. Crim. P. 30. Errors and Defects
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors

in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at
any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60. Relief from Judgment or Order
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg1nents, orders or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such
mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court,
and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the
appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new h·ial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
(1), (2), or (3), not 1nore than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-101. Title

ca

This chapter is known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act."

Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies

(1) This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction
or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies,
including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). This chapter replaces all
prior remedies for review, including exh·aordinary or comn10n law writs. Proceedings
under this chapter are civil and are governed by the rules of civil procedure.
Procedural provisions for filing and commence1nent of a petition are found in Rule
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) This chapter does not apply to:
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a
criminal offense;
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure; or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.

Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-103. Applicability--Effect on petitions

Except for the liinitation period established in Section 78B-9-107, this chapter applies
only to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1, 1996.

Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief--Retroactivity of rule

(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the dish·ict court of
original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or
sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct
for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the

controlling statutory provisions;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the
conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time
of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed
post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the
United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of
Appeals after conviction and sentence became final on direct appeal, and that:
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's
conviction or sentence became final; or
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime
for which the petitioner was convicted.
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner
establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in
light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence
and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing.
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner
is ilmocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9,
Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Postconviction Determination of
Factual Innocence. Claims under Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA or Part 4,
Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence of this chapter may not be filed as
part of a petition under this part, but shall be filed separately and in conformity with
the provisions of Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA or Part 4, Postconviction
Determination of Factual Innocence.

Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-105. Burden of proof
(1) The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The court may not grant
relief without determining that the petitioner is entitled to relief under the provisions
of this chapter and in light of the entire record, including the record from the criminal
case under review.

(2) The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section
78B-9-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove
its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.

Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief--Exception

(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief;
or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107.
(2) (a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including
during the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the
court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at
an earlier time.
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided
that it gives the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that
the ground could have been but was not raised at h·ial or on appeal, if the failure to
raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address the
exception set forth in Subsection (3).

~I

Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the
cause of action has accrued.

(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following
dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the
case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is
filed;
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(1)(f) is
established.
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was
prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United States
Constitution, or due to physical or 1nental incapacity. The petitioner has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief
under this Subsection (3).
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition
asserting:
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303; or
(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401.

•

(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations period
established in this section.

Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-108. Effect of granting relief--N otice

(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either:
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or sentencing
proceeding as appropriate.

~

(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be stayed for five
days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court
and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial or sentencing
proceedings, appeal the order, or take no action.
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time during the
stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift the stay and deliver
the order to the custodian of the petitioner.
(c) If the respondent gives notice of intent to appeal the court's decision, the stay
provided for by Subsection (2)(a) shall remain in effect until the appeal concludes,
including any petitions for rehearing or for discretionary review by a higher court.
The court may lift the stay if the petitioner can make the showing required for a
certificate of probable cause under Section 77-20-10 and URCP 27.
(d) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence the petitioner,
the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to arraignment, h·ial,
sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary.

Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-109. Appointment of pro bono counsel

(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the
request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the
petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal. Counsel who
represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be appointed to
represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following
factors:
(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will require
an evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the
assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot be
the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-110. Appeal--Jurisdiction

~

Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for
post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to Section
78A-3-102 or 78A-4-103.

ADDENDUMB
Transcript of Plea/Sentencing Hearing

-1IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

)

STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

) Case No.

061906774 FS

)

DENNIS T. WYNN,

)
)

_________________ )
Defendant.

)

Sentencing
Electronically Recorded on
August 25, 2008

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE ROBIN W. REESE
Third District Court Judge

APPEARANCES

For the Plaintiff:

Neal E. Gunnarson
9120 Stillwater Cir.
Sandy, UT 84093
Telephone: (801) 671-6222

For the Defendant:

Bradley P. Rich
YENGICH, RICH & XAIX
175 E. 400 S. #400
SLC, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 998-8888

Transcribed by: Natalie Lake,

CCT

152 E. Katresha St.
Grantsville, UT 84029
Telephone: (435) 590-5575
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on August 25, 2008)

3

MR. RICH:

4

THE COURT:

Could we turn to the Dennis Wynn matter?
Yes.

I' 11 call that case.

5

I remembered what the offer from the State was.

r
0

was two 2 nd Degree Felonie~,

7

correct?

8
9

MR. RICH:
Counts I,

THE COURT:

11

MR. RICH:

12

THE COURT:

14

MR. RICH:

16
17

18

I think

You mentioned i t

rt'"'!lonies;

is that

We had drafted that as

The remaining counts will be dismissed.

Okay.
Stipulation for sentencing as we previously

discussed.

13

15

That's correct.

II, V and VII.

10

two 3 rd DE!gree

Counsel,

Right.
I've been over an affidavit, believe that he

knows and understands the rights that he's waiving.
THE COURT:
imposed today,

Now Mr. Rich,

the sentencing was to be

is that --

MR. RICH:

That's what we anticipate is that the Court

19

will impose sentencing concurrent with the federal sentence which

20

he's serving on October 6 th ,

21

and leave open the issue of restitution until the date of that

22

surrender.

23

acknowledging that he has herewith today tendered $100,000

24

towards restitution.

25

and not issue a commitment on that

We'll be able to stipulate on the figure,

THE COURT:

In certified funds?
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MR.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. WYNN:

4

THE COURT:

GUNNARSON:

Yes,

Okay.

your Honor,

You're Mr.

Dennis Wynn?

Yes.
you've -- I know Mr. Rich is very

Mr. Wynn,

5

thorough,

6

what you're pleading guilty to?

so you've covered all this with him?

7

MR. WYNN:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR.

10

I see that.

WYNN:

THE COURT:

You understand

I do.
You've agreed to it?
I have.
I indicated to your attorney and the State's

11

attorney that I would accept their sentencing recommendations,

12

you'll be given a sentence of two counts -- on two of the counts

13

1 to 15 years in prison to run concurrently and two other counts

14

zero to five years in prison,

15

to run concurrent with the federal time.

16

issue a commitment until you're scheduled to report on your

17

federal commitment.

18

all counts to run concurrently and
I've agreed not to

I ' l l also order that you pay full and complete

19

restitution in an amount of at least $100,000, but probably as

20

your attorney,

21

that,

22

presented at the time you surrender.

23

understand?

I think in his words, were many times more than

but the two of you will agree on a figure that will be

24

MR. WYNN:

25

THE COURT:

Yes,

so

Is that what you

sir.

You've di~cussed with Mr. Rich all of the
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rights you're giving up, all the sentencing nuances, possible

2

consecutive sentences, even though I've indicated I'll follow the

3

recommendation.

You understand all of that?

4

MR. WYNN:

5

THE COURT:

6

sir.

You agree that you're guilty of these

ch,3r.gP.s?

7

MR. WYNN:

8

THE COURT:

9

Yes,

Yes, sir.
If you're sentenced today,

attorney has requested,

Mr. Wynn, as your

you lose the right to ask me to let you

10

withdraw the guilty plea.

11

withdraw the guilty plea is the date of sentencing.

12

day is today,

13

Do you understand that?

Since that

then that right is gone as far as you're concerned.

14

MR. WYNN:

15

THE COURT:

16

The deadline for making a motion to

I do.
The form that Mr. Rich has probably prepared

himself provided you, did you read it, Mr. Wynn?

17

MR. WYNN:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. WYNN:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. GUNNARSON:

22

THE COURT:

I have,

sir.

Do you agree to give up all of those rights?
I do.
The State's approved it as well?
Yes,

your Honor.

I'll approve it and note that Mr. Wynn has

23

signed it.

24

a 2 nd Degree Felony, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?

25

To the charges in Counts I and II,

MR. WYNN:

Guilty.

securities fraud,

-51

THE COURT:

To the charges in Counts V and VII,

2

securities -- let's see,

3

Degree Felony, Count VII,

4

a 3~ Degree Felony.

MR. GUNNARSON:

6

THE COURT:

I guess that's been amended to

It has been amended (inaudible).

Okuy,

a 3 rd Degree Felony.

How do you plead

to those two charges?

8

MR. GUNNARSON:

9

THE COURT:

10

theft.

a 3 rd

It's shown as --

5

7

one Count Vis securities fraud,

Guilty.

Guilty.

I'll accept the guilty pleas.

Anything else, Counsel?

11

MR. RICH:

12

THE COURT:

13

1 to 15s to run concurrent,

14

all sentences to run concurrent with each other on the federal

15

sentence.

16

and the amount -- stipulated amount submitted by October Gth ?

Nothing further.

MR. RICH:

18

THE COURT:

two zero to fives to run concurrent,

That's correct.
Mr. Wynn will report to federal authorities

on that date also to surrender;

20

MR. RICH:

21

MR. GUNNARSON:

22

THE COURT:

23

two

I'll order that full and complete restitution be paid

17

19

I'll impose the sentences we agreed to,

before he leaves,

is that correct?

That's correct.
Thank you,

Thank you.
your Honor.

Let us give Mr. Wynn a copy of his sentence

though.

Mr. Rich,

24

MR. RICH:

25

{Hearing concluded}

That's correct.

we can give that to you.

ADDENDUMC
Final Restitution Order

•

•

fll~D DISTRICT COURT
Thrrd Judic;a, District

OCT 2 l-2008
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, Bar No. 1273
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666
Utah Attorney General
5272 South College Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 281-1221
Facsimile: (801) 281-1224
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SALT LAKE COUNTY

a,--------~il(\LJ:ib~O~

DepJty Clerk..__..

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER OF RESTITUTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS T. WYNN,

Case No. 061906774FS
Defendant.

Judge Robin Reese

Defendant Dennis Wynn appeared before the Honorable Robin
Reese on the 25th day of August 2008 for a change of plea and
sentencing.

Plaintiff was represented by E. Neal Gunnarson,

Assistant Attorney General, defendant was present and represented
by his counsel of record Bradley Rich.
Pursuant to the Court's August 25, 2008 order, the State was
required to submit the amount of full restitution to the Court by
October 6, 2008, the date on which the defendant is to report to
serve his sentence in his federal case.

\l\,\

Fll~D DISTRICT COURT
Thrrd Judicial Dtstrict

OCT 2·1-2008
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By _ _ _ _ _~ : : - - - - -

After reviewing all pleadings in this matter, and

ffftf•er&~e

consideration, the Court hereby enters the following:
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-202 AND§ 77-38a-401,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1)

The defendant is ordered to pay restitution in this case

in the total amount of $782,068.63 to those victims identified on
Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
2)

The defendant is hereby ordered to make monthly

payments toward restitution in an amount to be determined between
the parties once the defendant has been released from
incarceration.

Payments shall be made payable through the Office

of the Utah Attorney General, Financial Crimes Prosecution Unit,
5272 South College Drive, Suite 200, Murray, Utah 84123, for
disbursement to the victims in this case.
DATED this

2--;_

6_<_~-------'

day of _ _

BY THE COURT:

ROBIN REESE
Judge, Third District

2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

-'2._

day of

f)(;!k;.~f.A_}

2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing "Order of
Restitution" to be served by the method(s) indicated below, upon
the following:
Bradley P. Rich, Esq.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
175 East 400 South, Suite #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

--·~\::-

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Overnight Express Mail
Via Facsimile (# _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Via Messenger

\l{-3

ADDENDUMD
Parole Hearing Transcript

-1HEARING

FOR DENNIS WYNN
Electronically recorded May 2, 2013
before Hearing Officer Jan Nicol

Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT
152 E. Katresha st.
Grantsville, UT 84029
Telephone:

( 435) 590-55 7 5
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on May 2, 2013)

3
started.

5

Dennis Terry Wynn, offender No. 50251.

MR. WYNN:

7

HEARING OFFICER:

Is that you?

That's correct.
All right.

8

Nicol.

9

conducting the proceedings today.

Welcome.

My name is Jan

I'm hearing officer with the parole board, and I'll be

Did you receive at least seven

days prior notification of today's hearing?

11

MR. WYNN:

12

HEARING OFFICER:

I did.
Did you receive a blue disclosure

packet?

14

MR, WYNN:

15

HEARING OFFICER:

16

i

Today is the time and place set for a re-hearing for a

6

13

,.

We're going to go ahead and get

4

10

11

HEARING OFFICER:

I did.
Have you had a chance to read the

materials given to you?

17

MR. WYNN:

18

HEARING OFFICER:

I have.
I am going to take sworn testimony

19

from you today, so I do need to place you under oath.

20

get you to raise your right hand, please.

21

affirm the information you're about to give is the truth, the

22

whole truth and nothing but the truth?

23

MR. WYNN:

24

HEARING OFFICER:

25

If I can

Do you swear and

I do.
Thank you.

All right.

I would like

to reflect on the record we do have visitors in attendance today.
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·,

1

It looks like members of your family are here, Amy and David

2

Carr, and it looks like Heather Fabian and Andrea --

3

MR. WYNN:

4

HEARING OFFICER:

I can't say it, but welcome.

We also

5

have on behalf of the victims, we have Ryan Stephenson.

6

like you're here and you'd like to speak, and we will allow you

7

an opportunity to do so, probably somewhere midway through the

8

hearing.

9

All right.

It looks

Mr. Wynn, as you have reviewed the blue

10

disclosure documents, is there any corrections or errors you want

11

to bring to the board's attention?

12

MR. WYNN:

13

HEARING OFFICER:

14

No.
So the information appears to be

correct to you?

15

MR. WYNN:

16

HEARING OFFICER:

Yes.
Okay.

Let me just kind of briefly

17

explain what we're going to do.

18

consider an original hearing, but it was held in absentia because

19

you were in federal custody at the time, so for the purposes of

20

this hearing, it is a re-hearing, but

21

treat it like an original hearing just because you were absent at

22

the last one.

23

1

Taunauta.

You already had what we'd

we're going to somewhat

We're going to go over obviously why you're in prison.

24

We'll discuss some of your history.

25

you.

I have some questions for

It's also an opportunity for you to ask questions or made
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additional statements or provide the board additional information

2

you want them to consider.

3

will be giving you a recommendation that I will be forwarding to

4

the board.

5

the five members of the board who will make a decision based on

6

majority vote.

There are five of them, so at least three of them

7

have to agree.

Usually you'll receive a decision within the next

8

two to four weeks.

9

MR. WYNN:

At the conclusion of this hearing I

I don't make any of the decisions.

Those are left to

Okay.

10

HEARING OFFICER:

11

MR. WYNN:

12

HEARING OFFICER:

Okay.

Do you have any questions?

Okay.

The records indicate that

No.

13

you're here on one case.

14

security fraud, a 2 nd Degree Felony, two counts, and security

15

frauds,

3 rd Degree Felony,

16

MR. WYNN:

17

HEARING OFFICER:

It's a 2006 case ending in 6774.

two counts.

Correct.
Your expiration date is August 24~,

18

2023.

19

words

20

you tell me in your own words what it is exactly you did.

21
22

25

Why don't you just kind of tell me in your own

I will read a summary of the information, but why don't

MR. WYNN:
federal stuff?

23

24

Okay.

It's

How far

do you want me to 90 back to the

Do you want me to go just to the state stuff?

HEARING OFFICER:

I just want you to summarize what you

did.
MR. WYNN:

I built a company for about 12 years, and

i.riv

-51

I -- we were privately funded, and it was a good business plan.

2

I didn't pay close attention to how it was funded,

3

of 12 years it failed.

4

i,,l

"'

and at the end

I was in some disbelief about it failing and trying to

5

keep it up, and I think I

6

There was a lot of pride trying to -- I had built this company.

7

From there I moved forward trying to do some of the same things.

8

I compartmentalized, and there was some denial.

9

car things with different people.

was in denial.

I

know I was in denial.

I tried to do

I did some real estate things

10

with different people that we had done in the company, and I over

11

projected and it didn't work.

12

didn't really happen.

13

HEARING OFFICER:

14

MR. WYNN:

15

HEARING OFFICER:

I tried to keep things up that

Are you finished?

Uh-huh.
Okay.

Well, I've summarized and the

16

offense was about four pages long, single spaced, so this is

17

really a summary of that.

18

offered or sold investments to at least six investors in the

19

State of Utah and collected $184,526.

20

introduced to you through a common acquaintance, while others had

21

known you for several years.

Between June 2003 and October 2005 you

Investors were either

22

When you approached potential investors you generally

23

told them their money would be used either to flip vehicles or

24

real property.

25

they would purchase vehicles at wholesale and then sell the

You claimed that through this vehicle program
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1

vehicles to purchasers with poor credit.

2

would arrange financing for purchasers at a fairly high interest

3

rate and would split the interest with the investors.

4

investors were told the vehicle title would secure their

5

investments.

6

I

You told investors you

Some

You also stated you could facilitate an investment

7

similar to the vehicle program with real property.

8

you would find foreclosed real property to purchase and sell

9

the property for a profit.

You said

You claimed the profits would be

a
f··I

r-

10

continually reinvested in additional real property.

11

some investors an unsecured promissory note while other investors

12

entered into verbal investment contracts with you.

13

You gave

Between November 2004 and June 2005 you offered to

14

purchase automobiles for three individuals in the State of Utah

15

and collected $62,000.

'16
17

18

You stated you could purchase automobiles

from auctions and wholesale buyers through your Arizona Cyber
Auto dealership.
Throughout your various dealings you never purchased

19

vehicles or the real estate promised, and used the money for

20

various business expenses, family members, family living

21

expenses, cash and personal purchases.

22

prior bankruptcy, $2 million in outstanding civil judgments, a

23

tax lien filed in Arizona for 163,000, the loss of your real

24

estate license and other delinquencies.

25

You failed to disclose a

}.'.

\)ii;J

In addition to bilking investors, you were charged with

338
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witness tampering.

2

the investigation and basically told them to keep their mouth

3

shut.

4

charges.

You contacted at least two employees during

You even threatened to implicate one of them in the

5

Does that sound accurate?
MR. WYNN:

The witness tampering part, I was not aware

6

that I was under investigation at that point in time, and they

7

were employees, so I -- I had conversation with them, that's

8

true, but I was not aware of investigation going on at that point

9

in time.

10
11

HEARING OFFICER:

But you still wanted them to keep

their mouth shut?

12

MR. WYNN:

13

HEARING OFFICER:

Yeah.

Okay.

So at this point I have

14

restitution is owed in the amount of $782,068.63.

15

$100,000 of this has been paid, and there's a balance of

16

$682,068; is that correct?

17

MR. WYNN:

18

it sounds correct.

It says

I don't -- I haven't seen those figures, so

19

HEARING OFFICER:

20

MR. WYNN:

Well, they were in the blue packet.

They're not in the blue packet that I have.

21

They may have been in the original blue packet, but that original

22

blue packet was sent --

23

HEARING OFFICER:

24

MR. WYNN:

25

HEARING OFFICER:

Have you paid more than $100,000?

Not that I'm aware of.
Okay.

Did you pay the $100,000?

-81

MR. WYNN:

2

HEARING OFFICER:

Yes.
Okay.

So as I look over the victims,

3

it looks there were 20 separate victims with losses ranging from

4

7,000 to $107,000 each.

5

MR. WYNN:

6

my blue packet, so

7

And I don't have the -- I don't have that in

HEARING OFFICER:

Well, I can't give you the victim's

8

addresses for mailing purposes.

9

information that you want to add upon, or does that pretty

Okay.

So any of that

Ir

10

·I

~

well sum it up?

11

MR. WYNN:

12

HEARING OFFICER:

I think that sums it up.
Okay.

So kind of -- how did you go

13

about -- because it sounds like many of these people were

14

friends.

I

15

!

MR. WYNN:

I worked for a financial planning company

16

that a lot of those people were sent to me.

17

who was a builder that I had some association with, and he had

18

some -- he and I had an association, and he led me to some of

19

that.

20

assign them to people.

21

I also had a friend

He convinced me to take some of my past contracts and

So it had to do with -- it had to do with -- it had to

22

do with the prior business dealings that I had.

23

contracts.

24

We were buying cars for bad credit people, so it was at the end

25

of all of that coming apart that this all took place.

We had created

We had built a business over a long period of time.
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i

HEARING OFFICER:

t guess -- how did you justify it

2

to yourself at the end of each day when you weren't really

3

delivering any product?

~

MR. WYNN:

4

Well, we actually still had contracts at

5

that point in time.

6

corporations, one in Utah, one in Arizona.

7

dealer.

8

I

9

able to do in the past.

I had two separate

We had cash flow.

We were still a

You know, I -- pride and denial set in.

-- you know,

some disbelief that I couldn't do what I had been

10

things fell apart.

11

I

--

There was

I had had a large organization and

you know, I believed I could do the things that I

12

had promised to do, or I had never made the promises to do them.

13

Even though I wasn't able to perform, you know, part of that was

14

I

15

what I was doing.

16

I promised these people that I had done.

17

them.

18

before.

19

had compartmentalized, you know.

I

I had bought cars.

believed -- I believed in

I had done the things that
My company had done

I -- it wasn't something that I, you know, hadn't done

HEARING OFFICER:

Okay, because one -- when one looks at

20

it, it almost appears like you were recruiting a victim to help

21

pay for your next paycheck.

22

because basically you recruit a victim, their money went into

23

your account, you spent it all because your account was in the

24

hole when you got it, usually.

25

mean it was obvious you weren't going to use the victim's money

I mean that's kind of how it looks,

You'd spend it all, and then -- I ·
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1

to buy anything because the money was spent.

2

MR. WYNN:

3

coming in.

4

I know that's how it appears.

5

my intent.

6

up being.

7

It

That's -- that's -- that was not

I know that's how it appears, and that's how it ended

You know, I've looked at it long and hard.

I've spent

55 months lookin~ at and wondering about it and trying to figure

9

it out.

I

was in denial that I

could make things happen that

10

weren't going to hap -- that wasn't going to happen, but they

11

were things that I literally had done and completed and done in

12

the past.

13

you know, we went to the auction, we bought cars, we had bad

14

credit people, we did all of those things.

It was things that my business had done that were

So part of it was just a sense of everything falling

16

apart at that point in time in my life.

17

the business had fallen apart.

18

I was literally left with all of the weight of taking care of

19

everything, a business that I was under a lease in Arizona,

20

employees -- I had over 80 employees at one point in time, and

21

all of the equipment, all of the files and all 6f the things to

22

take care of, and I was just trying to hold up too many pieces

23

all at the same time.

24
25

11

We still had an amount of cash flow coming in.

8

15

11

We had -- you know, we still had cash flow

HEARING OFFICER:

There were lots of --

I was left with all of the

~

Yeah, but it seems that you were

holding them up at the cost of a lot of victims.
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2

MR. WYNN:

that's what ended up happening.
HEARING OFFICER:

3

4

Were you honest with any of these

people at any point in their transactions with them?
MR. WYNN:

5

6

transactions and

7

said I could do.

8

9

Well, I realize that's how it appears, and

I felt like I was honest with them in the
you know, it ended up I couldn't do what I

HEARING OFFICER:

How are you proposing you're going to

pay back this restitution, because not only do you have the

10

restitution on the state case, but there's also the restitution

11

on the federal case.

12

MR. WYNN:

I've spent, you know, a good time of time in

13

the last 55 months really reviewing and looking at not only my

14

weaknesses but my strengths.

15

shows, I created an infomercial, I have a car program that I

16

created that's a good car program.

17

time.

)I

18

the internet and to do some positive things with it.

i'!

19

I've not only looked at what I've done, but I've looked at what I

20

could do to repay these people in the last 55 months, and I've

21

worked hard at it.

22
23

24

25

~I

,r

i 1 ve

In 1998 I did live talk radio

It was well ahead of its

worked on business plans in preparation to put it on

HEARING OFFICER:

Okay.

I have --

So you don't have a specific

plan in mind?
MR. WYNN:

I plan on using a car program that I created

and that is an actual car program to help pay these people back.

I
-121

I have a program

2
3

HEARING OFFICER:

MR. WYNN:

fi

HEARING OFFICER:

8

MR. WYNN:

9

HEARING OFFICER:

10

Okay, but what I asked you is is that

going to involve trading, selling or leasing?

From my standpoint?

Uh-huh, because I don't think it's

MR. WYNN:

From my standpoint, no.

12

information that's given to people.

13

HEARING OFFICER:

14

No.

going to be allowed.

11

Okay.

It's going to be

How are you going to profit off

of information?

15

MR. WYNN:

From -- well, there will be dealers that are

16

involved that will have to do transactions, but that will be away

17

from me.

18

11

It's basically information and it's on the

internet.

6
7

Is that going to involve

trading, selling, leasing vehicles?

4
5

Okay.

HEARING OFFICER:

I think anytime that you have any

19

contact with any kind of fiduciary type funds,

20

be question about what you' re doing.

21

MR. WYNN:

22

HEARING OFFICER:

23

there's going to

My information won't be fiduciary funds.
So you're not going to be collecting

any funds at all?

24

MR. WYNN:

25

HEARING OFFICER:

Payment for information.
Okay.

So hypothetically speaking, if

I
!
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you are to get out at some point and be able to pay restitution,

2

what is a reasonable amount that you're going to be able to pay

3

in a given month?

4

MR. WYNN:

I don't know.

I don't know the answer to

5

that right now, because I -- like I said, I've been out of the

6

market for a long period of time.

7

a great deal.

8

are at this point in time.

9

10

I'm going to have to take a look at where things

HEARING OFFICER:

MR. WYNN:

12

HEARING OFFICER:

I've liquidated -- everything I have is gone.

MR. STEPHENSON:

15

HEARING OFFICER:

MR. STEPHENSON:

18

HEARING OFFICER:

MR. STEPHENSON:

21

HEARING OFFICER:

I do have to place you under oath

Okay.
So if I can just get you to state your

Ryan Wesley Stephenson.
Thank you.

Do you swear to tell the

truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

23

MR. STEPHENSON:

24

HEARING OFFICER:

25

Thank you for the opportunity.

ful 1 name on the record for me, please.

20

22

Let's take a break right here

before we start.

17

19

Okay.

and we' 11 allow Mr. Stephenson to speak.

14

16

Did you liquidate all your assets to

pay your restitution?

11

13

Technology has changed things

Go ahead.

I do.
Thank you.

Okay.

The time is yours.
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MR. STEPHENSON:
here.

HEARING OFFICER:

4

MR. STEPHENSON:

Okay.
Before I do,

I have three words for

you, Dennis.

6

hard to do, but we forgive you, and I want your family to know

7

that.

8

few thoughts.

We forgive you, and I hope that sinks deep.

It's

I'm going to read my letter and then I'm going to share a
This is hard for me to be here.

HEARING OFFICER:

Okay.

MR. STEPHENSON:

As Dennis and I unloaded bags of rock

11

salt out of the BMW into our empty carless garage, my 3-year-old

12

son stood on the landing in front of our home to that same

13

garage.

14

think Dennis will either.

15

He said four words that I ' l l never forget, and I don't
He was 4.

uDennis, you're a liar."

I started to apologize and correct him, when Dennis

16

replied, "It's okay."

17

courage to say ·what I couldn't.

18

now with no hesitation.

19

a liar.

20

worked so hard for, but we came out victors.

21

r

I'm going to read it.

5

10

iH

I wrote a letter.

3

9

h

Thank you for the opportunity to be

Those words were so true.

Today it's our turn.

I owe it to my family.

You were a thief.

My son had the

I say it

Dennis, you were

You nearly destroyed what we had

Dennis has lied to us the day he came here -- until the

22

day he came here.

23

did with our money.

24

led us this way and that way, always providing a wee bit of hope.

25

He has never told us the truth as to what he
Even today, he hasn't told that truth.

Excuse after excuse rolled from his tongue.

He

It led us down a

________________________.

~
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1

path of false hope and lost dreams.

2

a thief of our opportunity and most of all a thief of our time.

3

These will never be turned.

4

author said this:

5

grows keener with constant use.

6

very truth.

7

A sharp tongue is the only edge tool that
Indeed, we were witness to this

8

a blessing from my church leaders who counseled us to move

9

forward.

We have.

Blessings have come our way.

Opportunity and

10

job growth have been ours.

11

t~ied to move forward and forget this tragedy, yet two things

12

have prevented a complete separation from our experience.

13

false hope of ever receiving what was once ours, and our total

14

forgiveness of Dennis.

15

never

16

too great.

17

never come to pass will only rob us of more time.

?e

paid back.

Burdens have been lightened as we've

The

We know that our devil -- our debt will

The dollar value of Dennis's restitution is

If we continue to have hope in something we know will

Today Peggy and I offer our complete forgiveness to you,

19

Dennis.

20

different, something more worthwhile, something brighter.

21

does not include you.

22

have remembered you in their prayers, praying that you will

23

become someone of character.

24
25

~-"'I

Washington Irving, a great American

Days after the sickening realization set in, I received

18

i=

He was a thief of our money,

We hold no malice.

Our hope has turned to something

Our hope for you is to heal.

It

Our children

We ask the justice system to erase from Dennis's
restitution the portion of funds (inaudible) for our family.

We

1
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1

do not want a monetary settlement.

2

spirit long enough, and now consider ourselves and Dennis free

3

from this debt.

4

Paul.

5

Peggy and I want no part of restitution if it means theft from

6

another to fill our pockets with that which is the root of all

7

evil.

We were once Peter.

We have been strained by the

We don't want to become

-·.
I speak of an age old adage of which we are all familiar.

8
9

Our fear is that Dennis will begin where he left off.
This comes from the lie we continued to hear to the time of

10

his incarceration.

11

responsibility for his actions which lead one to believe he's yet

12

to change his behavior.

13

heart, those that show true sorrow were never spoken.

14

words were I'm sorry.

15

rolled off of his tongue.

16

forgive.

17

There is a continued inability to accept

The two words which could soften any
Those two

I'm sorry were those two words which never
Even without hearing it, we still

As Peggy and I address the board of pardons, we are

18

advocates for one to have a second chance.

19

plead for Dennis's release, yet do not stand and plead for his

20

continued incarceration,

21

It is a decision that you must make and we do not envy you.

We do stand and

This is a burden that you must carry.

22

If it is decided that Dennis is no longer a threat of

23

committing this crime toward any other, then we have a specific

24

responsibility to accept this decision.

25

the contrary and Dennis continues to be incarcerated, we will

If the feelings are to
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also support the board's decision.

2

on our part either way.

3

We ask the Lord's blessings to be upon all of you in this

4

difficult time.

5

There will be no celebration

We remember your family in our prayers.

After I wrote this letter, my wife and I had an

6

opportunity to get away for a couple of days and had these

7

feelings that if Dennis can pay back to everybody else but us,

8

it serves no purpose for him to continue to be incarcerated in a

9

legal way.

If he can pay it back in a legal way.

10

continues, then we've failed the system.

11

decision, and we support you whichever way we go.

12

Dennis, we forgive you.

13

14
15

16

MR. STEPHENSON:

Once again,

Would you mind if the bailiff made a
Would that be okay?
That would be fine.

Some of it is

written, some of it is not.

17
18

That's the board's

Thank you.

HEARING OFFICER:
copy of your testimony?

If the pattern

HEARING OFFICER:
you.·

19

That's okay.

I appreciate it.

Thank

Mr. Wynn, do you have any comments?

MR. WYNN:

I'd like to tell Mr. Stephenson I'm sorry.

20

I've -- you know,

21

and working hard at correcting thought processes, and doing all

22

that I

23

through finding myself spiritually, working hard at accepting

24

responsibility and moving forward so that I could benefit my

25

family and benefit those that I've hurt.

I've spent 55 months looking at this scenario

could to change who I am.

I

basically have done that
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1

I

There isn't a day that goes by that I don't and haven't

2

prayed for not only the victims, but that I haven't worked hard

3

at making changes in my own life by studying and looking at,

4

praying, working at, doing all that I could to make sure that I

5

understood where I was at and why the decisions that I made were

6

made, how they affected people.

7

HEARING OFFICER:

How much impact do you think it really

8

has if you say sorry after he basically asked for -- I mean

9

basically says you haven't.

10

MR. WYNN:

11

HEARING OFFICER:

I don't know what else to do.

I mean I --

Well, and you may be indeed sorry, but

12

sometimes apologies, if they don't come on their own accord,

13

they're kind of empty.

14

MR. WYNN:

15

HEARING OFFICER:

I understand that.
You know, he has the analogy that I

16

actually wrote on my paper, because it is kind of a Peter and

17

Paul type thing.

18

Some victims got paid from each other, and it just kind of went

19

on and on and on.

20

I

I mean you were robbing from Peter to pay Paul.

don't know.

You know, I don't think you certainly --

21

like most people who commit fraud

22

it, okay.

23

play.

24

those that have the ability and don't want to pay for it, so I

25

don't know where you fall in that, but you owe a lot of money,

have the ability to pay for

There's a couple of types of scenarios that go into

There's those who don't have the ability to pay for it or
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I mean the federal system is $15 million.

2

comments that he doesn't think he's going to get his money back,

3

I mean he's absolutely right.

4

somebody else getting ripped off, I mean if you have some idea of

5

how you think that's going to get paid, you certainly feel free

6

to share it, but the fraud cases I've dealt with over the years,

7

you just ·don't see no return of $15 million.

8

to know, where did you spend it?

9

10

MR. WYNN:

So I guess I'd like

The $15 million is first of all, not an

HEARING OFFICER:

12

state money.

13

$184,000?

Okay.

Well, let's just stay with the

Where did you spend it?

--

14

MR. WYNN:

15

know at this point in time.

16

know, I don't know.

17

of me.

It's been

I

--

I

I

--

I

don't know.

I

don't

accept responsibility, but you

I don't know.

HEARING OFFICER:

19

board today, if anything.
MR. WYNN:

you know, it's

Where did you spend

don't have an accounting for it in front

18

20

Short of some type of miracle or

accurate figure, but --

11

~I

So when he

Okay.

What would you like to tell the

That I'm -- you know what, that I'm not the

21

same person that I was 55 months ago, that I've spent a lot of

22

time contemplating and looking at, asking my Heavenly Father for

23

forgiveness, studying, trying to prepare, look at a way that I

24

could take care of my obligations and responsibility, but

25

basically to be a different person.
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1

I've spent a lot of time reading, I've spent a lot of

2

time studying, I've spent a lot of time preparing, I've spent a

3

lot of time serving.

4

change my own heart and to be a different person than I was when

5

I

6

problems when I came in -- before I came in.

7

person today.

came in.

8

9
10

I

I've tried to do everything that I could to

was angry and prideful.

HEARING OFFICER:

I'm not the same

How do you think that's going

to change in terms if you were to be out?

How are you going to
~

change?

11

MR. WYNN:

12

HEARING OFFICER:

13

Okay.

I created a lot of

How am I going to change?
Yeah.

What is it that we're going to

see in outward form?

14

MR. WYNN:

I'm a different person today.

15

different.

16

trying to do the right things every day.

17

to do.

18

I think

I'm concerned about the people that I've hurt.

HEARING OFFICER:

All right.

I'm

I don't know what else

This case, as I previously

19

mentioned, carries an expiration date of 2023.

20

the case -- now a guideline, just so everybody is aware what a

21

guideline is, it's just kind of a general mark the board uses to

22

decide when to consider releasing somebody.

23

2010.

24
25

The guideline on

Yours is March of

So that's already come and gone.
I don't know that it probably even applies in the case

because the board will go above it or below it depending on
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1

aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and there's certainly a

2

lot of aggravating circumstances.

3

by itself is aggravating, and the number of victims, and the fact

4

that there's, you know, other similar type activities going on.

5

..:

So it has already exceeded the guidelines, and I'm

6

guessing it's going to exceed the guidelines by more.

7

at some point the board is probably going to extend you a parole

8

with an expectation that you start to pay back some of this, but

9

we're also very realistic in terms of what, you know, the victims

I'm sure

10

are going to get in the end.

11

Yes, we would.

12

out of a hat some offshore account, I don't think they're going

13

to get paid.

14

okay.

15

...

One, just the amount of money

Would we like them to be whole?

Short of you I guess pulling, you know, a rabbit

So -- but I do expect you to do some more time,

I personally haven't come to a recommendation, but my

16

guess is, you know, the board may be considering something

17

several years down the road.

18

parole, it's going to have conditions that state specifically

19

you're not to deal with fiduciary funds.

20

specific to say you're not to be dealing in automobiles, because

21

that's where a lot of this deception happened.

22

don't want you to do is to leave and go get a job doing the same

23

thing that you were doing to get you into this to begin with.

24

But we also don't want to incapacitate you to the point where you

25

can't work, either.

At such time, if they do order a

So any comments?

It may even be as

Certainly what we
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II

MR. WYNN:

2

consideration the amount of time that I've spent and now more

3

time is going to make any effect on -- positive effect on me, how

4

it impacts my family and how it also impacts the victims because

5

of, you know, the inability to even work to pay or help them at

6

all.

7

HEARING OFFICER:

say you pay $100 a month, okay?

9

yourself as a victim, because we have to divide it amongst the

: 11

12

victims.

14

10 victims, and you pay $100 a month.

How would you feel as a

victim if you got a $10 check in the mail each month?
MR. WYNN:

I guess it's better than nothing at this

point in time.

15

HEARING OFFICER:

And that's your comment, okay, because

16

I deal with victims on a regular basis, and I'm sorry, it's kind

17

of insult for a victim to get $10 in the mail.

18

effort on your behalf, but not only is it very insignificant, but

19

it's also a reminder every single month when you get the $10

20

check of what happened to you.

21

people very bitter.

22

I

I want you to kind of visualize

Just for easy calculation purposes, let's say there's

13

11

Let's just hypothetically, let's just

8

10

\I

I would ask the board to take into

It may be an

It -- you know, it can make

So as a victim, sometimes getting $10 in the mail is not

23

worth it.

24

there.

25

our agency.

Sometimes it's far more worth it just to have you sit

Those are the things we look at and we have to weigh at
So I just share that with you, because that's kind
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of what we kind of think about.

2

It's actually our No. 1 priority, but we also have to think about

3

is it really going to happen, and you know, I've had a victim get

4

a dollar check in the mail, okay.

5

(inaudible) because there's no much restitution, there are so

6

many victims by the time you disburse it.

That's what happens with fraud

7

So it -- oftentimes you end up getting a very insulted

8

victim, and I don't blame them, because if I had to remember it

9

every month when I got that little check in the mail, that would

10

be frustrating.

11

from.

12

to get it because then you can

13

doesn't become the burden that bears you down.

14

~,

Do we want restitution paid?

I can understand where Mr. Stephenson is coming

Sometimes you just have to accept that you are not going
you can go on with life, and it

So anyway, that's -- those are the things that the

15

board takes into consideration.

16

significant time in federal custody, but I'm going to tell you,

17

had you spent the entire time here, I don't know that you'd be

18

getting out, because we're considering it.

19

to your federal time.

20

into consideration, but I'm just going to tell you, you may need

21

to prepare to be spending some more time.

22

know, okay?

23

Otherwise, we'll close the proceedings.

We understand you've spent a

This runs concurrent

So those are things the board will take

What that is, I don't

If you have anything further, I'll let you comment.

24

MR. WYNN:

25

HEARING OFFICER:

I don't have anything further.
Okay.

You'll get the board's decision

I
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I

in• a few weeks, then.

Thank you.

(Hearing concluded)

